

104

CIA'S USE OF JOURNALISTS AND CLERGY IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Y 4. IN 8/19: S. HRG. 104-593

CIA's Use of Journalists and Clergy...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

CIA'S USE OF JOURNALISTS AND CLERGY
IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 1996

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

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CIA'S USE OF JOURNALISTS AND CLERGY IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 1996

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Arlen Specter, (Chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Specter, Kerrey of Nebraska, Glenn, Kerry of Massachusetts, and Robb.

Also present: Charles Battaglia, Staff Director; Chris Straub, Minority Staff Director; Suzanne Spaulding, Chief Counsel; and Kathleen McGhee, Chief Clerk.

Chairman SPECTER. The Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearing will proceed.

We regret the necessity to reschedule from 9:30 to 10 a.m. and we're just a few minutes after 10 a.m. now. That was required because Senator Kerrey, Senator Glenn, and I and others had been in a meeting with Director Deutch, as a matter of fact, at the Pentagon on the issues arising out of the bombing of Dhahran back on June 25.

We'll now proceed with the hearing on what public policy ought to be with respect to the issue of the use of journalists or clergy or Peace Corps representatives by the CIA. This matter came into prominence earlier this year on a collateral discussion in one of the reports, and then the matter was discussed briefly by the committee with the distinguished director. There had been quite a concern expressed by a number of people in the news media. The House of Representatives has since taken a vote on the subject as to the prohibition of use of journalists and others by the CIA. It is a matter which the committee thinks requires some analysis in the determination of public policy, perhaps by the Congress, or at least a consideration of that.

There had been a meeting with journalists and Director Deutch and a number of people have come to some terms which at least some thought satisfactory. But it's a matter for the Congress as to what the public policy of the U.S. Government ought to be.

There have been some suggestions that the issue should be decided only by the Director, not even by the Deputy Director. There have been some other suggestions that the matter ought to be decided only by the President—that it's a matter of that importance—and that it ought to take the analogy of a Finding, as with covert activity, so that it is a very specific and a really high level showing

of necessity before a journalist or Peace Corps operator or clergy would be used by the CIA.

There's been some other thinking that it ought to be limited to a specific period of time and that if the exception is to be made, the waiver of the prohibition, waiver by the President, that it ought to be a matter of national security interest, as we have many, many laws which involve prohibitions, but provide for a special exception on the waiver on a finding by the President of a national security issue.

There's a certain concern about even a discussion of these matters to any extent publicly, because it gives currency and publicity to this kind of an issue. But I think those who would retaliate and those who would make an example of journalists, as they did of Terry Anderson—who will be a witness here today—those people are fully aware of this potential.

It's a matter of considerable interest and there ought to be public consideration, congressional consideration, to try to formulate a policy.

We have a very distinguished group of witnesses this morning. Senator Paul Coverdell will be our lead witness in accordance with our practice to give deference to members. Senator Coverdell brings a unique experience as having been the Director of the Peace Corps. We had asked the Peace Corps to send a representative here today and that was not—I'm not sure quite why not, but it was not doable or not convenient.

We have the distinguished Director of Central Intelligence, John Deutch. We have a group of distinguished journalists. As I said, Mr. Anderson, who was kept by terrorists for some 6 years between 1985 and 1991 because they thought he was a spy, a CIA spy. We have the distinguished journalist from Nightline, Mr. Ted Koppel of ABC News; Ken Adelman, who has had extensive governmental experience, is now a columnist for the Washington Times; and Chairman and editor-in-chief of U.S. News and World Report, Mort Zuckerman.

Then we have a panel of Dr. Don Argue, president of the National Association of Evangelicals; to be accompanied by Mr. John Orme, executive director of the International Foreign Mission Association; Sister Claudette LaVerdiere, president of Maryknoll Sisters; and Dr. Rodney Page, deputy secretary general for the Church World Service and Witness Unit of the National Council of Churches.

We start with our distinguished colleague, Senator Coverdell, after we have a statement by Senator Kerrey, our Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I just have two very brief observations. The first is that I'm very uncomfortable with any public discussion of U.S. intelligence sources and methods. I recognize that our committee did not create this topic as a public issue—that's it's been a matter of great concern not only to the media, but also the House Intelligence Committee. Not this committee—and that much of what we're doing is in response to their concern as well as a provision on this topic, that was placed in the House Authorization bill.

Nonetheless, I don't see how public discussion of which Americans are or are not authorized to be helpful to their country as in-

telligence assets will improve the quality of U.S. intelligence. Much of the discussion that we just had with the Department of Defense centered on why didn't we know. Why weren't we able to find out what terrorists had in mind in regards to Americans deployed in Saudi Arabia? How come we weren't able to find out? Well, that is not likely—those questions are not likely to be answered as a consequence of us reading the morning newspaper or watching the evening news or going down to the Saudi Arabia Chamber of Commerce and having a discussion about what's going on.

Second, I may risk being politically incorrect in saying so, but I simply don't see why any profession should be completely and permanently excluded from the possibility of working with CIA or DIA. The determining factors should be the situation, and then the willingness of the individual. If lives are at risk or a vital national interest is at risk, I don't see why any American patriot should be forbidden to cooperate with an American intelligence agency. As I understand Director Deutch's policy I support it.

We have some very convincing people as witnesses today, but I must say, Mr. Chairman, it will be hard to move me from my present viewpoint.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kerrey.

Senator Glenn, would you care to make an opening comment?

Senator GLENN. I don't have a formal opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I think these hearings are very appropriate now, because we're, in a way, we're into a new day of new kinds of warfare internationally. We're into international terrorism and so on. You can't send satellites over and all at once pick up what's going on. We're into a time when human intelligence is going to be more important than I think it's been for a long, long time, and that's the toughest kind to develop. I guess having said that I see it as an individual choice. I sort of agree with what Senator Kerrey said that I wouldn't rule it in or out. If people feel they have information that's going to save lives or the Intelligence Community thinks that we need to learn a little more—that this particular person, be he or she clergy, journalists, or whatever, they want to approach somebody, and if that person is willing—they don't have to any more than Senators have to or anybody else. But leave it open as an individual choice as to the importance of it and how the individuals feel. But just have a policy that says we will under no circumstances, no how, no way even think of talking to the clergy or those associated with religious groups overseas or journalists, I think that would be a wrong policy, too. Because we're into a tough time for human intelligence, as I'm sure Director Deutch will comment upon in a few minutes. So I agree with the statement Senator Kerrey just made.

Thank you very much.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Glenn. We now turn to our distinguished colleague, Senator Paul Coverdell of Georgia.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAUL COVERDELL, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA**

Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here. I don't know what the decision apparatus was at the Peace Corps, other than that their director is in the Dominican Re-

public and that that may have related to their decision not to be here.

Let me say as forcefully as I know how that I would hope that the committee could conclusively set the Peace Corps aside as quickly as possible from this discussion. This issue was debated extensively by the founding apparatus, very carefully thought through and I think resolved in an appropriate way. It would be, in my judgment, exceedingly dangerous for our volunteers to be included in a context in which they may be representatives of the CIA. We have operating documents between the State Department, CIA and the Peace Corps outlining this policy. I think it's been prudently dealt with.

A director, for example, or employee and their principals, if they were ever operatives of the CIA, they're not eligible to be director of the U.S. Peace Corps. If there is an intelligence background for the previous 10 years, it would pre-empt you. I think it is a sound policy.

By way of background, I was Director of the Peace Corps for the majority of the Bush Presidency, from its inception to near it's end. I was Director of the Peace Corps at the time we were entering Eastern Europe in unprecedented numbers. Even 35 years later, as Director, I was confronted with assurances over and over that this was not an intelligence apparatus.

I remember vividly meeting the Solidarity Vice Minister of Education on a cold, rainy day in Warsaw. It was in the building that had been left by the Germans. It was the Gestapo headquarters, of all places. About half way through the presentation, he said I hope you will forgive me, but I am ordered to ask you this question. Are these volunteers associated with the CIA? And I could very comfortably say, no, they are not.

You would raise the doubt across the entire corps just by this kind of discussion. And you put at risk the Corps. We lost a volunteer in a program that I opened in Bolivia simply because there was a mistaken view that the woman was associated with the DEA. This is a life and death matter here.

I think the current policy is appropriate. I think—I understand the public discussion. But I remain gravely concerned about it and would hope that a resolution could come quickly in the public discourse, and that there would be a ratification of the contemporary policy, for the credibility of the Corps, the years that have been invested in achieving this credibility, and for the safety of the Corps. I feel very strongly about it. I've confronted it repeatedly.

As you may or may not know, the Peace Corps has even separated from the normal compound. It has its own facility, to reinforce these policies. It is long standing, it has worked well for us, and I can see no achievement that would be accomplished that could not be done through other apparatus and options. So I have no doubt about this in my mind.

I understand, you know, you are always going to have debate about important questions such as this, but it would be wrong headed to change the policy.

Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to respond to any questions that any of you have.

Chairman SPECTER. Just a question or two, Senator Coverdell.

You have referred to the current policy with respect to the Peace Corps. I think it would be useful if you would state it specifically for the record.

Senator COVERDELL. It is embraced in a letter of April 2, 1984, which I have in part—I can get the entire letter for you. But I would read the salient provisions. Under eligibility—

Chairman SPECTER. Let us turn on the clock. I should have started it earlier. Five minutes per round. Should have started it for witnesses and Senators. But we will try to limit the comments of Senators to 5 minutes, and opening statements to 5 minutes to leave the maximum amount of time for Q&A.

Senator COVERDELL. All right, Mr. Chairman. It says, permanent ineligibility. Persons currently or formerly employed by the Central Intelligence Agency shall be permanently ineligible for Peace Corps volunteer service or employment by the Peace Corps.

Now ineligibility for a minimum of 10 years. Any person who has been employed by an agency or division of an agency other than the Central Intelligence Agency, a substantial part of whose mission has been determined by the Peace Corps General Counsel to include intelligence activities shall be ineligible for service as a volunteer or for employment for a period of 10 years from the last date of employment by such agency.

Ineligibility for a period in excess of 10 years. Individuals may be ineligible for service or employment for a period in excess of 10 years where the General Counsel determines that their background or work history with regard to intelligence activities warrants such action.

Related work. Applicants for Peace Corps volunteer service or employment whose background or work history discloses a substantial connection with an intelligence activity or related work, other than through employment, shall be ineligible to serve as Peace Corps volunteers or as employees of the Peace Corps for a period of time ordinarily not to exceed 10 years from the date of their last connection with the agency or Activity.

And it goes on, but I think—

Chairman SPECTER. I see, that's the core. Thank you, Senator Coverdell.

There is a contention, and we have Director Deutch's prepared comments, so we see that he has crafted what he is proposing is a very, very limited exception to the prohibition, and that limited exception arises, as he articulates it, in two situations: saving the lives of hostages or information which would suggest a terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction or great risk to American citizens or the lives of others.

Would you consider any exceptions to the prohibition you have articulated?

Senator COVERDELL. No, because once you establish the exception, it is in the mind of the host country from that point forward, of the potential of it. I just feel that given the size of our Intelligence Community and the assets the United States have, it can operate apart from embroiling this Agency and the people there, and I think putting them at great risk.

Chairman SPECTER. Does the prohibition you have articulated serve to protect Peace Corps volunteers from suspicion of being FBI agents as a practical matter?

Senator COVERDELL. Absolutely. It is designed to reinforce our contention from day one that those volunteers are there in a capacity of assistance and mutual understanding and they are not part of an Intelligence Community.

When the Peace Corps was first founded, of course this was an enormous obstacle to overcome, and it has remained so. To the credit of the Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community, we have mutually been able to protect these volunteers and its mission, successfully, with a few limitations.

You know, these are people without assets. They are in—it's a very difficult situation we would be putting these Americans in if we were to violate it. Violate it on one point and you have done it across the board.

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Coverdell, we very much appreciate your joining us. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. I would like now to call the distinguished Director of Central Intelligences the Honorable John Deutch.

Welcome, Director Deutch. We appreciate your coming again today. We again commend you for your distinguished service as Director of Central Intelligence, and look forward to your comments.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN M. DEUTCH, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Director DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appear this morning at your request to explain the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency concerning the possible use of American journalists, American clergy, or Peace Corps members.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I am uneasy discussing potential intelligence sources in a public session, but I am in a position to make some general statements on this very sensitive issue.

Simply put, the Central Intelligence Agency policy is not to use journalists accredited to American news organizations, their parent organizations, American clergy or the Peace Corps for intelligence purposes. This includes any use of such organizations for cover. The policy that I have just stated, Mr. Chairman, has been in place for 20 years.

Recently—19 years, more precisely. Recently, at the request of this committee, I reviewed the policy to determine whether it was both appropriate and sufficiently circumscribed. As I told you, Mr. Chairman, and this committee, when this issue was raised with me, my sympathy is on the side of the no intelligence use of American journalists or clergy. I strongly believe in the independence of our free press and the division between the Government and the church. That is why I have stated publicly that I have no intention of using either American journalists or clergy for intelligence purposes.

Further, as the committee knows, I have found no circumstances while I am Director of Central Intelligence, that have caused me to do either. But, Mr. Chairman, as the Director of Central Intel-

ligence, I must be in a position to assure the President and the members of the National Security Council and this country, that there will never come a time when the United States cannot ask a witting citizen, knowledgeable citizen, to assist in combating an extreme threat to the Nation. So I, like all of my predecessors for the last 19 years, have arrived at the conclusion that the Agency should not be prohibited from considering the use of American journalists or clergy in exceptional circumstances.

I am able to imagine circumstances, Mr. Chairman, in which the lives of American hostages depend upon particular knowledge only a journalist might have or obtain. I can foresee the possibility of a terrorist group attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction in a crowded urban area, where both the President and the Nation would look to the Agency to use all possible measures, all possible means, to detect and deter such an event.

Under either of these scenarios, I believe it is unreasonable to foreclose the Central Intelligence Agency asking an American citizen, with their knowledge, to help be a source of information.

Now, critics of this decision might well say that these are far fetched examples in which the possible confluence of highly improbable circumstances is fanciful when weighed across the possible suspicion that it puts clergy and journalists, Peace Corps volunteers, who are abroad at risk. Unfortunately, recent history has shown that the threat in these scenarios is very real. I do not believe that as Director of Central Intelligence I can gamble that future sources of critical information will come only from predictable sources. Nothing in my 14 months in this job supports that kind of judgment.

Having decided that I should allow the possibility of exceptional waivers, I looked carefully at your request, at the guidelines which govern such waivers. I found them restrictive but non-specific. I have therefore issued new policy guidelines which set out several specific tests that must be satisfied before the Director or Deputy Director may consider a waiver. These guidelines have been available to both Intelligence Committees. They are classified and I am available to discuss them in any detail the committee may wish, in closed session.

But I want to state that the guidelines require prompt as well as periodic notification of the Intelligence Committee in those extraordinary circumstances when an exemption to the policy might be granted.

Let me repeat, these guidelines allow for the possibility of a waiver, but they do not compel or encourage such waivers. I have not changed my view that it would take extremely rare, indeed highly improbable circumstances, to change my predilection against any waiver of our policy not to use journalists, not to use clergy, for intelligence purposes.

There is one other aspect of this question that deserves comment in this public session, which is who ought to be the official entrusted with the responsibility of deciding whether to waive this policy. I considered whether the President ought to be the decisionmaker. In the end, we decided such decisions should remain with the Director. The Director is the official entrusted with running intelligence operations. The Director ought to be respon-

sible for this operational, albeit extremely important decision, in those rare situations where it might be contemplated. If the Director fails to, give the matter proper attention or judgment, the Director can be overruled or fired by his boss, the President.

Let me return for a moment to the Peace Corps. Here, too, our policy is not to use Peace Corps personnel for intelligence purposes. This has not changed, and here any waiver could occur under even more circumscribed circumstances.

Last, I would like to close by commenting on the Richardson amendment adopted by the House. The Richardson amendment requires that the President decide any waiver on the intelligence use of an American journalist. I have said, as I believe this gives the President greater flexibility to overrule judgments if this decision rests with the Director. The Richardson amendment also excludes cases of voluntary cooperation between the Agency and a particular journalist. This is important, because we would never contemplate a relationship—never contemplate a relationship without the witting and willing cooperation of the individual involved.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I am happy to answer any questions you may have that are appropriate in a public hearing, and of course, I will be pleased to provide any additional details you may wish in closed session.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Director Deutch.

We shall proceed—pursue the issue of the guidelines in closed session. If any question arises in this open session which you would prefer to defer to a closed session, please feel free to do that.

The statute which was adopted by the House last month by an overwhelming vote of 417 to 6, provides that, an element of the Intelligence Community may not use as an agent or asset for the purposes of collecting information any individual who, No. 1, is authorized by contract or by issuance of press credentials to represent himself or herself either in the United States or abroad as a correspondent of the U.S. news media organization, or is officially recognized by a foreign government as a representative of a U.S. media organization, and the Richardson amendment, which you have referred to, proposes to—and this was enacted, strike an element of and insert a policy, it is the policy of the United States and an element of waiver, the President may waive subsection A in the case of an individual if the President certifies in writing that the waiver is necessary to address the overriding national security interests of the United States. The certification shall be made to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

Under subsection C, voluntary cooperation, provides that subsection A shall not be construed to prohibit the voluntary cooperation of a person who is aware that the cooperation is being provided to an element of the United States' Intelligence Community.

This issue has not yet been considered by the U.S. Senate, and we are looking at a House determination to lodge that authority in the President.

Your proposal is that it be with the Director, and that is not an assistant or any designee of the Director, but limited to the Director himself, herself?

Director DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman, as I think you know, I believe that big agencies require the Director and Deputy Director be working together. The Director is frequently absent, the Deputy Director has to be in a position on all matters to act for the Director. So if you say Director, I always mean by the Director and the Deputy Director because the Deputy Director acts with authority in the Director's absence.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, when the Director and Deputy Director are absent, who acts as Acting Director?

Director DEUTCH. I don't think such circumstances arise sufficiently frequently to consider them. There is always either the Director or the Deputy Director are present.

Chairman SPECTER. So your standard would be to exclude any third party beyond Director or Deputy Director?

Director DEUTCH. That's correct.

Chairman SPECTER. Director Deutch, you talked about journalists and clergy. Would you include in that the Peace Corps?

Director DEUTCH. Yes. The criteria—the conditions for Peace Corps are slightly different but are essentially the same. As was mentioned by Senator Coverdell, there is an additional document, an agreement undertaken some years back which governs this. They are essentially the same.

We do not have any case ever thinking about the use in policy terms of an active Peace Corps volunteer. The regulations which could be waived here concern the measures that he read about, ex-Peace Corps volunteers, and restraints on them.

Chairman SPECTER. Director Deutch, you have said publicly that you have not used any of these categories of individuals by the CIA during your tenure and it is generally accepted that this is a very, very unusual or extraordinary circumstance, and we do not have on the public record nor will we put on the public record where such usage has been made. The presumption is that it just isn't done.

Considering the infrequency and considering the sensitivity, why not elevate this particular matter to the level of a Finding for covert action? A covert action has a very special place in the national security laws requiring that the President make a Finding, that it be in writing so that there is no issue as to a casualness or indirection or delegation—only by the President. The notification is given to the Intelligence Committees of the Finding, and we have periodic oversight on such covert action. In light of the sensitivity of this issue and its infrequent use, not particularly burdensome for the President, why not adopt the overwhelming view of the House in leaving to the President with his waiver for an exception for rational securities which we have in so many sensitive legal matters?

Director DEUTCH. Well, I believe there are two compelling reasons for not doing so, perhaps three. The first is that the Director of Central Intelligence should be considered responsible for operational management of human intelligence activities of this country, the human collection activities of this country. If there is any doubt about the ability or the judgment of the then-sitting Director

of Central Intelligence to make such operational judgments, that individual should be replaced.

Second, I think it is very important to leave room between a decision that the Director takes and the President to have Executive oversight, and should the President see the Director make a decision in this matter that should be overturned, the President can do so, and indeed he can, on that matter, replace his Director of Central Intelligence. I think that it is very important that one does not have—this is independent of any Administration—one does not have day-to-day involvement of a White House in operational matters of the Intelligence Community.

Chairman SPECTER. But Director Deutch, it would hardly be day-to-day on the infrequency as we project this, and if you have the public insurance of the respective foreign assurance that it is only going to be done with extraordinary circumstance with the President himself or herself, isn't that an added protection that doesn't place too high a burden on the President or too high a cost on operations, without really undermining the Director's authority?

Director DEUTCH. I believe, sir, that the President should have a Director of Central Intelligence for whom he or she has trust in that person's judgment, or that person should be replaced. I believe that the President should have an ability to oversee these decisions and come to a different conclusion should he or she so desire, and furthermore, I do not believe that one should have the White House under any—this is not a partisan remark, it is a remark about the occasional and periodic—from time to time involvement of the White House in a matter like this and in operational intelligence matters is not something which I think is good. I think it should be left to the professional organization to make the initial judgment.

But we all understand, sir, that when that judgment is made, there would be immediate notification of both oversight committees. There is not a question about that. So the other way of having these decisions overseen is by immediate notification of both this committee and the House Oversight Committee. So there is plenty of room here to have the decision overseen by both the Legislative and Executive branch.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Director Deutch, I press you just a little on this because this is going to be a matter to be considered by the Senate, since it is the House provision, or would be a matter in conference if in fact the Senate acts on this legislation. When you talk about Presidential oversight, do you contemplate the Director informing the President of this extraordinary use of an intelligence asset?

Director DEUTCH. I would think that the Director of Central Intelligence would inform the President or the Vice President or the National Security Advisor about an action which is taken like this.

Chairman SPECTER. So there would be that information?

Director DEUTCH. Yes.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, if it is of sufficient importance to inform the President through the National Security Administrator, then—the National Security Counselor, then that brings the question up as to whether—if it is going to reach him anyway, if it shouldn't be his decision. But I have your thinking on it and I

think it is important to have the thinking of the Director of CIA so the Congress can make an informed judgment.

When you talk about notification to the Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate, the current statute has come into some controversy as to how prompt is prompt, how soon is soon. We had a lot of that on Iran-Contra. We had some remedial legislation introduced. I did some in 1987, Senator Cohen did some, tried to set a parameter of 24 hours. That was never enacted.

What would you contemplate in terms of notification to the Congressional Oversight Committees?

Director DEUTCH. I would think that from decision time to notification of the Chairman and the Ranking Members, in an instance like this I think it would be at that level, it would be the Chairman and the Ranking Members, 48 hours would be the goal one should have.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that is very helpful. That might even establish a parameter for other items of notification.

Director DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, we appreciate your coming in, Director Deutch, and appreciate the logic of your position, and we will pursue the details of the policy in closed session.

Director DEUTCH. Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. We appreciate your being here.

I would like now to call the third panel, in alphabetical order: Mr. Kenneth Adelman, Mr. Terry Anderson, Mr. Ted Koppel, and Mr. Mortimer B. Zuckerman.

[Pause.]

Mr. ADELMAN. Shall I begin, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SPECTER. In a minute. I want to introduce you properly, Mr. Adelman.

Mr. ADELMAN. Thank you.

Chairman SPECTER. I worked with you when you were in the Administration before, but I wanted to be sure I got your credits exactly right, so I called for your resume.

Mr. ADELMAN. I'll give you 45 minutes to do so.

Chairman SPECTER. I can't do it in that short a time.

[General laughter.]

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Adelman was director of the U.S. Arms Control Disarmament Agency for approximately 5 years, and I had considerable contact with him at that time on the critical questions of arms control. He accompanied President Reagan on superpower summits with President Mikhail Gorbachev. He had been deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations from 1981 to 1983 with the rank of Ambassador, second in command at that time to Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick. His full resume will be included as a part of the record. He now serves as a columnist to the Washington Times and I think brings an unusual perspective from both government and journalism to this important question.

Now the floor is yours, Mr. Adelman.

[The material referred to follows:]

KENNETH L. ADELMAN

Kenneth L. Adelman was Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for nearly 5 years, accompanying President Reagan on his superpower summits with Mikhail Gorbachev, until leaving in December 1987. He had been Deputy

U.S. Representative to the United Nations (1981 to 1983) with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, second-in-command to Jeane Kirkpatrick.

Called "one of the most brilliant foreign policy minds around" by the *Wall Street Journal*, Ambassador Adelman was described by Pravda as "a zoological anti-communist." Moscow's Tass News Agency wrote: "Pharisaism, duplicity, and fabrication of falsehoods is [sic] a political hallmark of Mr. Adelman."

He now pursues: (1) writing; (2) teaching; and (3) corporate consulting in the international realm. In *writing*, he is a nationally syndicated columnist and national editor of *Washingtonian* magazine, for which he does a monthly interview entitled "What I've Learned." Besides hundreds of articles, he has published four books—*Getting the Job Done* (1992); co-authoring *The Defense Revolution* with Norman Augustine (1990); *The Great Universal Embrace* (1989); and *African Realities* (1980), which drew upon his 2½ years living in Africa.

In *teaching*, he has a course on Shakespeare and a graduate course on national security studies, both at Georgetown University. He also is a featured public speaker and frequent television commentator.

He was a founding member of the Sherlock Holmes Club in Washington; participated on the Zaire River Expedition, a 3-month voyage down the Congo River on the 100th anniversary of Stanley's trip; and translated for Muhammad Ali during his 1974 heavyweight bout—"the rumble in the jungle"—in Zaire.

Adelman received his B.A. from Grinnell College and both his Masters and Doctorate from Georgetown University. He now serves on the boards of The Princeton Review, IPAC, Newmyer Associates, Freedom House, and the American Refugee Committee. Along with his wife Carol and two daughters, Jessica (21) and Jocelyn (19), he lives in Arlington, Virginia.

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STATEMENT OF KENNETH ADELMAN, SYNDICATED COLUMNIST

Mr. ADELMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's good to be back with the committee. I spent many happy hours on verification and on other important issues, worked very closely, and have great respect for the committee.

Mr. Chairman, to allow most time for questions, I would summarize my remarks in four points. Firstly, this whole controversy is interesting in what it says about the press. In many respects, we all work with the press, have respect for the press. But the level of self absorption by the press is quite amazing, always.

This report by the Council on Foreign Relations—actually an independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations—has important recommendations about the future of intelligence and organizations. One slight sentence that implied something about the press became the critical sentence of this report.

When you look at this whole controversy, you realize that the press will concentrate on whatever affects itself rather than, as I say, the substance of the issue. I wish we would have as elaborate a public discussion about the substance of the report than this covert issue.

No. 2—

Chairman SPECTER. When you make that comment, would you amplify that just a bit? What would you like to see discussed on the report?

Mr. ADELMAN. Well, I think the parts about economic intelligence are very interesting, the whole reorganization, the whole question of whether there should be the kind of cut backs in the intelligence budget that we've seen in the Pentagon, or the quality of intelligence. I found—during my almost 12 years in government—that intelligence was very good for verification of missile silos and fu-

ture programs coming along. It was very weak when it came to summits, or anticipating what the Soviets were going to do at the next round of arms talks.

At Reykjavik, which I think was one of the critical events of the cold war, we were very surprised by what Mikhail Gorbachev did at Reykjavik, and I don't think we should have been. There are other instances when intelligence could have been far better.

Chairman SPECTER. How might we have improved that? That was certainly a classical event, October 1986. It was of enormous importance, really, stands out. What could intelligence have done better there?

Mr. ADELMAN. There should have been some leap of creativity—and I say that with some responsibility on my part, as well—that the situation of the Soviet Union warranted Gorbachev doing something dramatic, rather than as we assumed to come and just say hello. It was after the Daniloff Affair, at a time to heal the relationship. All the interpretations and predictions for that summit were understandable, but they were all dead wrong, as it turned out. It was a wild and woolly weekend. I think it was a very productive weekend—one that led to the decline and collapse of the Soviet Union. It certainly was one of the great weekends of my life.

But my point is that for such an important event, intelligence should have been better. I have always liked the idea of competition in the intelligence realm—not just having one flow of information about what might happen on judgments coming up to top decisionmakers. In other words, competing theories or approaches which are all too rare in intelligence findings.

Those are the kinds of things the committee should really concentrate on. But one little sentence that doesn't even mention journalists in the Council on Foreign Relations report evokes this hearing and previous hearings and three or four editorials in the Washington Post, etc., etc.

My second point is that this should be a non-issue. I agree that the current policy of the Government is just fine. I think that along with Senator Kerrey. I don't know why any group of professionals should be exempt—whether journalists, or clergy, or even Peace Corps members—from cooperating with the CIA if they choose to do so. I have no problem requiring the same procedures used for covert operations.

I listened closely to DCI Deutch, a man whom I have known for years and have the utmost respect for. He explained why he's against that same procedure. Yet the three reasons he gave to me didn't seem convincing, especially in light of him saying that this happens very, very rarely, so it wouldn't be a burden on the Agency.

Point three is on the argument that this would taint journalists, or endanger journalists. Journalists are already tainted and endangered. When Senator Coverdell says that one of the Peace Corps volunteers in Bolivia was apprehended because he or she was suspected of being a DEA agent, that shows that no matter what your committee does or what the President of the United States does in denying that any journalist or clergy or Peace Corpsman will ever be in the CIA or affiliated with the CIA, all those denials will be laughed off, ignored, or discounted, especially by the bad guys of

the world. These bad guys are the ones we care most about—where human intelligence needs to penetrate, because of possible terrorist attacks and weapons of mass destruction.

I see my red light is on. Let me end by saying one last thing. Yes, American journalists are journalists. But they are also Americans. I see no reason why they shouldn't feel some kind of civic responsibility when American lives are in danger, and feel the urge to serve our country.

Now, I know many of them do feel that civic responsibility. They should be allowed to act accordingly. It does not take great leaps of imagination to come up with scenarios of weapons of mass destruction putting lives in danger, when they shouldn't, for a moment, step out of their role as journalists and care about our country and about saving lives.

A few years ago I interviewed Bob Woodward, who I consider one of the finest journalists. I asked him about the Janet Cooke affair, which was his biggest error of the Washington Post's in the last X number of years. He said the main thing he did wrong was to think about this only as a journalist, and never in those many discussions to go out and find where Joey, the supposedly 12-year-old boy who was on drugs, lived and whether he could be rehabilitated. Woodward learned that he should have stepped out of his role as editor and journalist for a moment, and showed concerned on the human being behind the story. That was never done. Had he done so, he would have obviously saved himself from a great error and would have done a tremendous service for his newspaper, as well as set a very good example of the kind of thing I am talking about today, where American journalists serve America and help save American lives.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Adelman.

We have been joined by Senator Kerry. Do you care to make any comments, Mr. Kerry of Massachusetts?

Senator KERRY of Massachusetts. Well, Mr. Chairman, the only comment I would make is to express—I understand Bob Kerrey may have expressed this also—I am deeply concerned about a public hearing on this subject, to be candid with you. To whatever degree other governments may have questions about whether we do this or not, those questions may be best left without an articulation of policy. But here, it seems to me, if they weren't tainted before, they sure as hell will be tainted afterwards. Whatever doubt or question marks might have arisen, we sort of articulated it as a matter of policy we may do this. Which may leave us no choice but to suggest that there were certain areas where we shouldn't be doing it. I tend to be one of those who feels that most intelligence gathering can be done outside the use of certain kinds of people.

I think—I tend to agree with Senator Coverdell, that the kinds of things we are trying to achieve with the Peace Corps would be extraordinarily limited if people thought we were going to, as a matter of course, potentially use them as intelligence gatherers. So would I think the issue of clergy and others be similarly tainted and the flow of information and our desires for it would be hindered ultimately. So it may be that the salutary impact of this will be to elicit from us a prohibition, rather than to have left it in

doubt as it has been up to now. But I am very uncomfortable with the public discussions, and that's all that I would say at this point.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

We'll now turn to Mr. Terry Anderson, who had been bureau chief for the Associated Press in the Mid East and was taken hostage for a period of some 6 years, from 1985 to 1991, and we'll hear the circumstances from you, Mr. Anderson, in your own words, as to what the impact was of your being a journalist in the representation or concern of your being a spy, and as you said earlier in our private discussion, a spy for the CIA.

So the floor is yours; you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF TERRY ANDERSON, JOURNALIST

Mr. ANDERSON. Sir, I would like to begin by saying I share Senators Kerrey's and Coverdell's concern about this public discussion at all. It makes me uncomfortable. The damage has already been done, I believe most prominatly by Director Deutch's acknowledgement that there was a Director's option, that there were exceptions to the general rule, and that such things had happened in the past. So the best thing that we can do, I think, is try to repair the damage by a greater prohibition, without exceptions.

We are talking about a real danger. This is not imaginary. Both as personal experience and in my duties as the Director of the committee to Protect Journalists, I know that journalists are put in danger by the perception that they are connected to intelligence agencies. We all know that in much of the world, the CIA is viewed with great suspicion and distaste, and that journalists in those same places begin with a presumption on the part of many people that they are somehow connected with intelligence gathering.

I have been accused of being a spy, not just on the occasion of my captivity, but on other occasions in various places. I was told by a number of people that I was on a list of CIA agents kept by the fundamentalist Shiites who captured me. That is a perception that is very difficult to disprove. It's hard to argue with them. They are very suspicious people.

On a more general sense, I would like to make a couple of points, if I may. If we are making rules for anyone, part of the consideration has to be the behavior of the people to whom the rules will apply. If they are generally orderly, obedient, and respectful of rules, then we can afford to make the rules somewhat less tightly and provide for exceptions and interpretation. If they, on the other hand have shown themselves to be disrespectful of rules and are of a tendency to stretch exceptions, then we have to make the rules considerably stricter and apply them more forcefully. With all due respect Director Deutch, I would suggest that there is sufficient evidence on the part of the CIA to put them in the second category rather than the first.

There is no exception, no formal exception in the law, to very many things such as speeding or burglary, although it is much easier to conceive of circumstances that were grave enough to force you to speed or to break into someone's house than there is around the question of using journalists as intelligence sources. I find it very difficult to conceive of a journalist having information of any

such importance to the Nation and keeping it to themselves. It's against nature, I would think.

I would suggest to the committee that the insistence of the CIA on a formal exception in this way, no matter how strict, in this very public debate, to a principle they seem to accept very well, that is journalists, clergy, and Peace Corps people are put in danger of their life by this suspicion, already does harm, that it increases the perception on the part of many that when a journalist appears in a troubled area, there is even a small possibility that he or she is connected to espionage. I think it is dangerous and unnecessary. I think we need an absolute and public blanket ban on the recruiting or use of journalists, clergy, or Peace Corps workers by any intelligence agency of the United States, and also I might add, on the use of journalistic cover by intelligence agents.

I think the whole question is a dangerous one.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Anderson.

We now turn to Mr. Ted Koppel, well known as being the anchor of ABC News Nightline. Mr. Koppel is a 33 year veteran of ABC News, has been praised widely for having the in depth analysis, appearing nightly for one half hour. He has been the recipient of many awards: 25 Emmy awards, 5 Foster-Peabody awards, 8 DuPont-Columbia awards, 9 Overseas Press Club awards, and the list goes on and on.

We welcome you here, Mr. Koppel, and it's a rare opportunity in a question and answer session to be able to pose questions.

So the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF TED KOPPEL, ANCHOR, "NIGHTLINE," ABC NEWS

Mr. KOPPEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for inviting me here this morning and for this opportunity to make a few preliminary comments.

As you no doubt expected, I am unalterably and categorically opposed to the notion of the CIA having the legal option of using journalism as a cover for its officers or agents. Having said that, there are circumstances under which the Agency has, under what it perceives to be the greater national interest, broken American laws in the past, and I have no doubt that it will continue under such circumstances to do so in the future.

Pragmatism demands that we accept that as a fact of life in the gathering of intelligence. It does not require, however, that Congress sanction such illegal behavior with its own benediction or that it facilitate the process by changing our laws.

Let me begin by giving you the perspective of someone who has been a working journalist for more than 35 years. As things already stand, most governments, police, and intelligence agencies around the world assume that many, if not most American journalists working overseas are, at the very least sharing information with the CIA and probably work for the Agency. Since that is the way most of them operate, it is only natural that they assume that we do so also.

Until now, we have been at least able to point to American law to insist that we would be breaking the law if we worked simulta-

neously as journalists and intelligence operatives. It wasn't much, but it was all we had. Occasionally we were even able to convince people, in other countries, that Americans are curiously attached to their laws, even when those seem to complicate the process of governing.

It will be much easier for those foreign government and agencies if we give them yet another opportunity to assume that the United States is, after all, just like them. It will certainly make life much more difficult for my colleagues and me. It will also place an even greater strain on the worn thread of credibility that exists between American journalists and our readers and viewers if they are left to wonder which of us are still trying to maintain some ethical and professional standards and who among us is actually working for U.S. intelligence.

Those of my colleagues who have devoted a lifetime striving for fairness and objectivity in their work, who have genuinely reported without fear or favor, will now have to settle for the assumption that they were just maintaining their cover.

How often the CIA would actually use such cover is beside the point. The relevant question is how often it would be assumed, both home and abroad, that American reporters are working with a second secret agenda.

Which brings me back to my initial point. The gathering of intelligence is a difficult, dangerous, and sometimes dirty operation. That is not my judgment. That is what we have repeatedly been told by senior intelligence officers. It is they, including the distinguished current Director of Central Intelligence, who explained the use of tainted assets by invoking the need to deal with crooks and thugs in the interest of protecting our national security.

When, as they sometimes do, U.S. intelligence officers circumvent or even break American laws, they must reckon with the possibility that they will one day be held to account. If their arguments are persuasive, if it is true that the national interest could not be served in any other fashion, the Congress can be expected to be lenient and understanding. But at least everyone understands that a line has been crossed and that there may be consequences. If the CIA must on occasion use the role of an American journalist to conceal one of its operatives and to protect the greater national interest, it will do so, regardless of what is decided by Congress. But let that continue to be in the knowledge that a free press is being endangered and that American law is being broken.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Koppel.

We now turn to Mr. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, who has an extraordinary resume—all the resumes will be made a part of the record—an MBA from the Wharton School, a Master of the Law from Harvard, University of Paris Law School, and he is chairman and cofounder of Boston Properties, chairman and editor-in-chief of U.S. News and World Report, and chairman of the Atlantic Monthly, and chairman and co-publisher of the New York Daily News.

With that background, we welcome you here and look forward to your remarks.

Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The material referred to follows:]

BIOGRAPHY

MORTIMAR B. ZUCKERMAN

Mortimer B. Zuckerman is Chairman and Co-Founder of Boston Properties, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of *U.S. News & World Report*, Chairman of *The Atlantic Monthly*, Chairman and Co-Publisher of New York's Daily News, Chairman of *Fast Company*, and Chairman of Applied Graphics Technologies (AGT).

Mortimer Benjamin Zuckerman was born on June 4, 1937 in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. He is a graduate of McGill University, Montreal, with a First Class Honors Degree in Economics and Political Theory (1957) and a degree in Law (1961). He received an M.B.A. with distinction from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (1961) and a Master of Law from Harvard University (1962). He also studied at the University of Paris Law School and the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.

He currently serves as a trustee for New York University, trustee and member of the Executive Committee of Thirteen/WNET (New York), trustee of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Institute, trustee of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, member of the Harvard Medical School Board of Visitors, member of the Chase Manhattan Corporation National Advisory Board, and member of the University of Maryland College of Journalism Board of Visitors. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a member of the Board of Directors of the American Friends of the Rabin Medical Center and the Association for the Wellbeing of Israeli Soldiers.

Mr. Zuckerman is a former Associate Professor of City Planning at the Harvard Graduate School of Design and former lecturer of City and Regional Planning, Yale University. He is a past president of the Board of Trustees, Sidney Farber Cancer Institute, Boston; past trustee, Beth Israel Hospital, Russell Sage Foundation, Ford Hall Forum, and Museum of Science, Boston; and past chairman, Board of Visitors, Boston University School of Medicine.

Mr. Zuckerman belongs to the Harvard Club (New York and Boston) and the Harmonie Club (New York).

The *Atlantic Monthly* magazine has a circulation of 461,000 and a readership of 1,300,000 opinion leaders. *U.S. News* has a circulation of 2,400,000 and a readership of 12,400,000. The *New York Daily News* is New York's largest newspaper, with a daily circulation of 760,000 and a Sunday circulation of 970,000. Applied Graphics Technologies is the largest pre-press company in America. Boston Properties is a national real estate development company.

Mr. Zuckerman is President of the America-Israel Friendship League, Chairman of the Board of the Soviet Jewry Zionist Forum, and a member of the Board of Directors of the American Friends of the Rabin Medical Center.

STATEMENT OF MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN, CHAIRMAN AND EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT

Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I would like to refer to the subject by recounting the specific experience which in a sense was brought up by Ken Adelman, namely the Daniloff case approximately 10 years ago. Nick Daniloff, at the end of his tour of duty as the Moscow Bureau Chief of U.S. News was meeting one of his sources, a man by the name of Misha, who asked Nick if he would bring to him Stephen King novels as his farewell present. When they met in some wooded area in Moscow, Misha gave to Nick a package as an exchange gift and immediately disappeared. Nick was immediately surrounded by the KGB, and in this package there were a series of pictures which in fact had previously been sent in to U.S. News a year earlier for publication, and which we found, frankly, uninteresting, to the point that we didn't publish them.

Nevertheless, he was accused of being an intelligence agent for the CIA.

It turned out, however, that there was even more to the story than even this particularly outrageous incident, because on an earlier occasion somebody had deposited a package in Nick Daniloff's mailbox, and asked that he turn this over to the American ambassador, which he did. Within that package there was yet another package to be given over to the CIA Station Chief, and within that package there was some material which was considered to be important for the intelligence interests of the United States.

They asked Nick who might have given him this package. When he mentioned the name of somebody who had the wonderful name of Father Potemkin, a name that apparently did not even raise any hackles or any suspicions. Nonetheless, the CIA then tried to contact Father Potemkin, and used Nick Daniloff's name in the process, so that in one sense his name was now being associated with activity on the part of the intelligence services.

I mention this because I think, if I understand this correctly, this may very well have been inconsistent with the guidelines of the CIA for the use of journalists, and I think it gives an example of the degree to which journalists are exposed in the greater interests of the intelligence interests of the United States.

I do not wish to suggest that these intelligence interests are not serious or substantial or legitimate. But obviously there are another set of interests which are equally serious, substantial and legitimate. So whatever gains may be justified and whatever grounds may be used to justify intelligence work by the press in whatever form this may take, it seems to me that these gains must still be assessed in the context of what they do to the press as an institution of a free society. The central role of journalism is that of a constitutional check on government and not as an instrument of government. I think the notion of trust and confidence in the press and their objectivity as seen by their readership is critical.

Any association, it seems to me, with a government agency, or particularly with intelligence services, undermines the credibility and the greater good done by independent journalists. Untainted journalism today is likely to do more good for America, it seems to me, than anything that the occasional journalist acting as an intelligence agent might accomplish for intelligence purposes. The independence of journalists and journalism is a precious national resource, and it is in its independence from government that journalism renders to government its greatest service.

So I would share in the conclusion that these prohibitions must be, if anything, increased and made more absolute. I do not do this frankly just on the basis of the risks that are associated with journalists serving abroad. In a sense I think there is a widespread understanding that journalists assume certain risks when they do serve abroad. I really do it because I think it undermines the very critical and constitutionally protected role of journalism.

As I said, I think here the greatest service which journalism can do to America is to continue to serve in this constitutionally protected independence from government. It is not enough, in my judgment, to say that if an individual consents, that is, if he is witting, that he therefore should be available as a resource or asset for the intelligence services. Because the effects of this individual's decision go way beyond what this individual may or may not be in-

volved with. I think it affects the role of the press, it affects the security of the press, it affects the integrity of the press, it affects the creditability of the press and all of these, in my judgment, are critical enough so that they should be maintained through a greater prohibition than presently exists today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Zuckerman.

The report by the Council on Foreign Relations released earlier this year, Making Intelligence Smarter, the Future of U.S. Intelligence, has brought this issue into public view, and as noted earlier, produced legislation in the House of Representatives by a very lopsided vote, 417 to 6. And it does involve the public discussion of a very sensitive issue.

I would like to start with you, Mr. Anderson, and your comment about your own personal reluctance to talk about the matter publicly. The issue is, what kind of a judgment is to be made here? Is it to be shoveled under the rug? Is there to be a public policy determined by Congress? You have already had the House of Representatives act. The Senate may or may not act. We have the choice on that. But we are looking at some very specific legislation in the House. It is a matter for Intelligence Committee oversight as to what the policy is.

And you, of course, were a major victim of being suspected of being a spy.

How significant a problem do you think this is for journalists on an on-going basis? I think the—there would be considerable interest as to some of the details as to what you went through, what kind of a price you paid, as a suspect journalist.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

I consider it as a very significant danger. I am not the only journalist working in the field to have had his life threatened and put in danger by the suspicion that he or she was a spy.

Chairman SPECTER. How frequent is the problem, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. ANDERSON. Depending on who you are dealing with, I think it is fairly frequent. You begin with the presumption on the part of many people, for instance it is true among many of the fundamentalist Muslim groups that were prevalent in Lebanon during their civil war, that all journalists were spies, and particularly American journalists. That was just assumed.

I believe that the only course that would any—would accomplish any great healing for the damage that has already been done would be a restatement of a flat ban without exception. I don't think there is anything else that could help the situation right now. A statement of a formal exception, no matter how hedged, no matter how restricted, would simply be an acknowledgement to those who suspect us of being spies that, yes, on occasion, you are right. And that, I think, is a very dangerous thing.

My captors, while they treated us at times very roughly, and there were those in our group who were subjected to torture, did not actually torture me—they interrogated me a number of times and quite roughly, and insisted—to give you an example of the way their minds works, one of the questions that was put to me quite often was, give us the name of the CIA agent within the AP that you report to, the assumption being, of course, that there was one.

Of course, there isn't, never has been, and never will be. They asked me many, many questions on the assumption that I had some contact with intelligence. They were not satisfied for a good long time—I am not sure they are entirely satisfied now with my complete denial, or my attempt to explain the role of the press in the United States.

I have had on other occasions, had loaded weapons pointed at my head by screaming militiamen, shouting, spy, spy. I know many of my colleagues have had the same experience.

There is no way to tell how many journalists have actually died because of this suspicion. The CPJ keeps tracks of attacks on the press and we relate some—I believe it was 55 last year—journalists dying in the course of their duty. But their circumstances are generally fairly obscure and they occur in places where it is difficult to pursue an investigation, and where there is generally no recourse to the courts or to the police. So we don't know how many of those more than 50 journalists died because of such suspicions. I think most of us assume that at least some of them did.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Koppel, the House had its bill in its initial form was an absolute prohibition, and then an amendment was offered which gives a national security interest exception for the President to make a determination which is fairly frequent on some of our public policies which we attach prohibitions to, but to make a national security exception.

I understand your view being totally opposed to an exception, but why not an exception on extraordinary circumstances—hostage taking, weapon of mass destruction, something that the President would have to make a determination on personally.

Mr. KOPPEL. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, as you've heard the Director of the CIA objects even to that kind of a modification where it would have left, as I believe you suggested, in the form of something equivalent to a Presidential Finding. I would have less trouble with that. Indeed, I think you can infer what I said, my assumption is that the CIA is going to do what the CIA has to do under circumstances of extreme emergency. If lives are at stake, if the national interest is genuinely threatened, then I think that regardless of what Congress finds and regardless of what laws are in place, that our Intelligence Community will do what it has to do. I would simply like the reassurance of knowing that there was a legal line in place and that those people who are violating the law recognize that there may be consequences for that. By removing those kinds of consequences, you simply create a circumstance where there is absolutely no prohibition against this kind of thing, and we are left with the good will, the professionalism, the assumption that the motives of the Director and the Deputy Director of the CIA are similar to—they certainly are not parallel to or equivalent to those of a country that believes in a free press.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, you pose an interesting conclusion to official action even in the face of a prohibition, that they will do what they have to do even if it violates the law.

Mr. KOPPEL. Well, basically isn't that what a Finding is, Senator? I mean, it gives the President and only the President, as I understand it, the ability to say to the Intelligence Community and

to pass on to the Senate and the Congress, his opinion that the national interest of the United States is so in jeopardy that it warrants bending the law, breaking the law. All I am saying is keep the law in place and make it at that rare an occurrence. I don't like the idea of this being done at the convenience of the Director of the CIA or the Deputy Director of the CIA. Force them to go to the trouble of bothering the President with it. I guarantee you then they are not going to be doing it every day.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I understand more fully what you mean. I had thought you had said that the law would be violated. But the law is not bent or broken when the President makes a Finding. That is a legal exception under very tight guidelines.

Mr. KOPPEL. That is exactly right, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. So when that is done, the law is being observed.

Mr. KOPPEL. That is exactly right. But it would preclude the CIA or any intelligence agency doing this on its own.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, we prize ourself very, very highly of being a nation of laws, and laws that cannot be violated even by the President. We have precedent for that with the Supreme Court having said so. The President himself is another citizen when it comes to this—

Mr. KOPPEL. With all due respect, sir, we also have precedent for the intelligence agencies of the United States routinely violating laws and simply assuming that they won't be held to account. All too frequently, I am afraid, they are quite right.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I think that is because they are not detected. It is not because they are not held to account; they are not detected. The hard part is to find out about it. The toughest thing to do is to find the facts. Find the facts, then there is less problem of agreeing on what the appropriate policy is if we can find the facts. But finding the facts is very, very hard, and that is a matter of congressional oversight. And we do too little of it.

We did a job in this room of what happened at Ruby Ridge when we found the facts, and had some very fundamental changes by the FBI itself on the use of force in a constitutional context. This is a matter of great public concern, that we really ought to thrash out and decide what we want to do in a very deliberative way, without just delegating it, lock, stock, and barrel to the CIA Director, however much we may approve of the current one on an informal basis. It's a matter of great public policy.

So the essence of your conclusion, Mr. Koppel, is that that would be a satisfactory conclusion to make it formalistic, the President has to make a Finding, it has got to be in writing, which requires deliberation and then notification to the Oversight Committees for this rare occurrence.

Mr. KOPPEL. I am reluctant to agree totally with you, Senator, while I can understand that you inferred that from my remarks. My preference is that the law simply remain in place and if the law currently gives the President the capacity to override with a Finding of some kind, then I am afraid that is going to have to be acceptable under extraordinary circumstances.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Koppel, we have no statute which governs this matter. It is up to the policy of the CIA Director as to what he will do and what his judgment requires.

Mr. KOPPEL. I think that would be unacceptable, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that is the current status of the law. That is why the House has acted on the matter and that is why we are considering it.

Mr. Zuckerman, you articulate the constitutional check on government on the independence of a free press, and while you do not cite first amendment guarantees as something which would be broad enough to exempt the media, and of course, the most famous statement is Jefferson's, he would prefer a government—he would prefer newspapers without government than government without newspapers.

Do you think that the current state of the law inhibits news coverage? Is it a problem, the coverage of news around the world?

Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Well, I think if, as we have all discussed here, it is now understood that there are circumstances under which the press may be used or involved in intelligence work, and as I tried to cite from the personal experience of U.S. News, we've seen where that has been invoked, it seems to me that you do have a constant inhibition on the ability of the press abroad to serve its function, to bring, as Ted said, without fear of favor, but frankly to make the most probing and aggressive reporting possible. It is too easy for government officials abroad, especially those subject to this kind of probing, to be able to dismiss these people as being, in a sense, intelligence agents.

So I think you have a balancing of interests, and I would argue that the value that is served by having a press that is untainted by any possible association with intelligence, who bring back day after day, week after week, and year after year, as much unvarnished reporting as they possibly can, something that I believe would be inhibited by the possibility that there may be some association with an intelligence service. I think that value, particularly if you put it in the context of the unique role of the press in our society, both legally and publicly, and I think that value justifies the elimination of those circumstances, rare though they may be, of where the press may be involved.

There are two national interests in a sense involved, and I think the on-going, day-to-day, week-to-week, year-to-year role of the press abroad, in terms of what it brings back to this country in the way of knowledge and intelligence made available to its readers, to its viewers, and made available without qualification, without any sense on the part of the public that they may be involved in some way in a government mind set, and particularly as they do their reporting abroad, whatever inhibitions the possibility of their association with intelligence services may present, if those inhibitions could be eliminated by an absolute prohibition, I frankly think it would serve this country's interests better by having this unfettered role of the press to bring back this information than preserving any suspicion and taint, even though it may be unique to very particular circumstances, whether it be approved by the Director or whether it be approved by the Director and by the President. I just think that in this balance, which is what we are, it seems to me,

seeking here, that the balance should tilt in favor of the day-to-day, week-to-week, year-to-year reporting role for the press abroad, and bringing that information, knowledge, and news back to this country.

Chairman SPECTER. So you would argue for no exception at all, not even by a Presidential Finding on a showing of national security interest.

Mr. ZUCKERMAN. That is correct.

Chairman SPECTER. You have seen, in your capacity as the leader of a major news organization, that it is a substantial inhibiting factor on news coverage and informing the American people and the people of the world as to what is going on.

Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Well, I think it, as I try to illustrate with the story of Nick Daniloff, I mean, there was a journalist who was arrested, it clearly had a chilling effect, it seems to me, on the whole journalistic community in the Soviet Union at the time. He was indirectly involved in an association with the CIA through behavior on the part of the CIA that contributed to, although I am sure it wasn't the sole reason why he was, in fact, arrested, because there was, as you know, an arrest of a Soviet spy here, Ganady Zakharov, and this was a really trading bait kind of situation. But the cover, the patina of intelligence association was therefore sort of in place on the part of the Soviet Union, and if you read George Shultz's description of this in his autobiography, you will see how he felt this weakened his ability to negotiate with the Soviets on this. I do think there are certain limits that are in place as a result of the possibility that there may be an association between the press and the intelligence services of the United States.

As I say, yes, there will be individual and specific situations where the press may be uniquely helpful in a particular situation, but I think there is a cost to that. It is not just the cost to the personal security and lives of journalists. Virtually every journalist who has been arrested, every American journalist who has been arrested over the last 50 years, has been arrested on the grounds that somehow or other, he was involved in intelligence for the United States. It just seems to me that there is a much greater value to having the greatest degree of flexibility and freedom on the part of the press as it serves abroad to bring back whatever they can in the way of information and knowledge. If that is going to be affected on a day-to-day, week-to-week, year-to-year basis, which I believe it is, I think there is a value to eliminating that inhibition and that limitation even though I recognize that there are other situations, unique though they may be, when the press would perhaps have a positive role to play in a particular situation involving national security, whether it be the kidnapping of American hostages or even a situation where some terrorist organization hopes to threaten the United States with some kind of weapon of mass destruction.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Adelman, you were the defender of a greater access to more sources. You've heard the very strong statements made here. Would you settle for a law which allowed the exception, but only on a Finding with the President's direct judgment?

Mr. ADELMAN. I have really no opinion. I have no opinion between the DCI's Finding and the President's Finding.

Since I am in the minority, and three gentlemen I respect very much see this issue differently, let me comment on Terry Anderson, who served so nobly and is a personal hero of mine. Nonetheless he is caught in a massive contradiction. For he was apprehended and held because of alleged association with the CIA, although it was not true. There was nothing that he could have done to explain that he was not working with the CIA. Journalism is inherently a dangerous profession. Everybody who goes into journalism knows that very well. There is no way to prevent journalists from seeming to be tainted.

Terry Anderson makes the very good point that his captors have strange minds and see the world in bizarre ways. If that is true, they are not going to know the distinction between the DCI's Finding, the President's Finding. They don't follow the New York Times carefully on a day-to-day basis.

When Ted Koppel—who I really think is wonderful, as does most of America—says the CIA routinely violates the laws and is not held accountable, I think he is in a time warp. That was a problem in the 70's. I do not think it was a problem after that. My experience in government has been that the CIA is, if anything these days, because of the revelations of the 70's, too timid and too cautious, rather than too bold.

And, with all due respect, I find Ted's argument quite perplexing, that the CIA will violate the laws. He would like to have a law prohibiting any kind of association, obviously, between journalists and the CIA. Therefore, if you need to act in the kind of scenarios I was talking about, involving hostage whereabouts, or nuclear devices, he would say, "Well, the CIA will break the law."

I don't want a system, and certainly, Mr. Chairman, I know that you don't, where to do a reasonable, rational thing requires breaking a law. There is something wrong with our system if that's the recommended course.

Finally, let me say that when Ted says that he worries about his reader's and viewer's respect—and that is indeed something to worry about—every opinion poll of public respect has journalism among the lowest, and CIA among the top. So I think that—according to the American people, the CIA is a very respected organization, even with its problems, while journalism is not. So maybe Ted Koppel's profession would be helped and not tainted by associating with the CIA.

Last, Mort Zuckerman, when he talks about the Daniloff case, it is a perfect illustration again of my point. When he mentions that a journalist has been arrested because of suspicion of his link with the CIA, that suspicion will always exist regardless of what laws or exceptions happen right here. Ted is absolutely right when he says most foreign countries don't have this prohibition. I don't think any country has the prohibition that we are talking about here. So the wide suspicion is that journalists will work for their intelligence agencies and many of them do, including among our European allies.

So that is the way the world works. I think that to create a situation where we have to break the law to protect American lives or

to protect cities or stop weapons of mass destruction, would be a terrible conclusion to this debate.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Koppel, would you care to reply?

Mr. KOPPEL. Yes, sure.

First of all, why don't we go all the way, then. Why don't we simply enlist all American foreign correspondents overseas with the CIA and be done with the nonsense of assuming that we had nothing to do with one another. It seems to me that the great paradox that is inherent here is that people overseas, because we gather so much information, because, in fact, journalists are in the intelligence gathering business, and because we distribute it so widely, because we tell everybody exactly what we know back here in the United States, we share with our consumer, including the CIA, everything we know, sometimes more than we know. Because of that, the assumption is that we are somehow connected with intelligence agencies overseas. It's only back here in the United States that the assumption is made by the intelligence agencies themselves that if only somehow they could get us to work for them, there is more information that we are somehow keeping to ourselves, that we share only—I don't know with whom, you know, perhaps with our managers, perhaps with our wives and sweethearts—that if only they could get us to work for them, they would have more information. I am not all together sure sometimes what it is that my friend Mr. Adelman thinks we are protecting back here, if not those aspects of the United States that are totally different from other countries. Among them the kinds of protections that people are given when they have been arrested; among them the kind of—and I realize it is difficult to use the term purity in connection with anyone engaged with the business of journalism, but the sort of perceived purity that exists at least in terms of what our freedoms are.

Among those freedoms is that we not be connected with the Government. I think it really will have an adverse affect on the way that our consumers, our readers, our viewers, perceive what we say, if the assumption has to be made that some or all of us are working for the Government at any time. That is not my job.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Zuckerman, do you care to reply to what Mr. Adelman said?

Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes. I think just to comment on his reference again to Nick Daniloff. I think the reason why Nick Daniloff got involved with the KGB was the fact that they had a previous connection between him and the Central Intelligence Agency in which Mr. Daniloff was, in the narrow sense of the word, unwitting. So I think, in fact, CIA did involve Nick Daniloff in a way that may very well be precluded by the rigorous application, even of the present law.

But again, I would like to just say that, to follow on what Ted Koppel says, I think journalists who are working abroad as reporters are trying to bring back as much information as they can, and I think that is the role they serve, and it is an important role. I think we see the degree to which this country, in the event of a major crisis, watches the news media or reads the news media to realize how important that is.

I think anything that inhibits that sort of regular flow in the ordinary course of work of a journalist, is a real limitation on its role and its value to this society as a particular source, at least of independent information. I do recognize that there are situations such as the ones you mentioned, where there is, as I say, a hostage situation or even the possibility of a terrorist act of one kind or another, where, if the journalist happens to have a particularly unique knowledge or access, there is some value to having him involved. But if you do that and you do not have the absolute prohibition given what it seem to me has transpired both publicly and given the attitudes that are prevalent around the world, not that all of them are going to be eliminated by anything that is said or done in this country, but I do think it would contribute in many places and in many ways to a greater access of American media abroad to what they have to do, which is to report and to ferret out information and to send that information back, without any sense on the part of the countries where they are serving that in fact they may be involved with the CIA, and obviously back here as well.

So I have to tradeoff two values and I come out in favor of the continuing use of the press as a resource to provide independent information to the American public. That is their role in this society and I think it would—not to be totally compromised, but may very well be compromised in certain ways under those circumstances, and I would rather eliminate that possibility and have them serve that day-to-day, year-to-year function, even though in some other individual situations, they may not be able to be used where they may be useful.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Anderson, I see you seeking an opportunity to reply.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

I would ask Mr. Adelman that because there is widespread suspicion in some areas that journalists are involved in espionage, why do we have to increase that suspicion with a formal provision for circumstances in which it might be true. We should be working to reduce the suspicion, which all journalists do, not increase it. Because there are circumstances which we can all easily conceive of in which it might be necessary to break into someone's house, do we need to formally provide for those circumstances in the law that says burglary is illegal. I don't believe so.

We cannot under—in any way limit the choice of an individual, no matter what his profession or his ethical standards, to provide information in circumstances that seem necessary to him. That's not really an issue here. I don't think any journalist who really and truly believed that lives were at stake or that there was great danger to the country would keep such information to himself. He might choose to make it generally public, or he might choose to pass it on to someone who could act on it, but it would certainly not remain a secret.

What we are concerned with is the acts of the CIA. We are concerned with their understandable but eager search for information in all circumstances and from all people, and for the possibility that they might provide their own agents, professional agents, with cover as professional journalists, which has happened in the past.

I believe we are all aware of that. We don't want CIA to do anything to increase the danger to us, and we don't want to allow the CIA to believe that there are any circumstances in which they may legally contemplate that, even though we acknowledge that they probably will.

Chairman SPECTER. Do you want a short sur-rebuttal, Mr. Adelman?

Mr. ADELMAN. Yes, I will be short.

Of course we have procedures for burglary when it's for law enforcement. That is guaranteed by the Constitution in our search and seizure procedures. That's a perfect illustration of what I'm talking about. There may be an overriding reason, and a court procedure to do that.

When Ted Koppel says he doesn't know of any information that journalists keep, most of the time that is absolutely true. But there are, in Ben Bradlee's book, cases where a journalist finds something that is very sensitive that would do more damage than contribute and so he holds the information. We would hope that most journalists do that. If they knew the start of the Gulf War, for example, it was better just to hold that information for 12 hours and not go broadcasting that because it would certainly help the enemy.

Let me say I am not talking about signing up every journalist. I am talking about a situation where the CIA gives direction to somebody that could be extremely helpful. I'll give you a clear example. When Terry Anderson was being held hostage, if the CIA knew that he were alive he would most probably be in one of two places. And if a journalist was in good contact with the captors or those close to the captors, and this was a critical piece of information that they really couldn't get elsewhere, whether Terry Anderson was alive, I see nothing wrong with the CIA station chief talking to the journalist. He'd say, "Listen to my situation, I want to know one simple fact. Is Terry Anderson alive? I don't know how you get that information, maybe ask to interview him, maybe by talking afterwards, whatever it is. But I need that information and I can save his life by knowing that." Do I think that's wrong? No. I think it's absolutely fine, in fact noble.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I think it's been a very useful discussion. I have two final questions, which I think lend themselves to a yes or no, but I don't like any imposition of that, which I'll ask Mr. Zuckerman, Mr. Koppel, and Mr. Anderson.

Do you think, if there were an absolute prohibition in American law that the CIA could not use journalists, Peace Corps people, or clergy, that there would be a significant improvement in their safety that would be recognized by people around the world who are currently suspicious? And absolute prohibition. Would it make a big difference, Mr. Zuckerman?

Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes. And increasingly over time.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Koppel?

Mr. KOPPEL. I think it would make some difference, but I think it would make an even greater difference, Mr. Chairman, in terms of our fading credibility, as Mr. Adelman points out, here in the United States.

Chairman SPECTER. Would it make a big difference, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. ANDERSON. I believe it would make a difference. I don't know how large. I believe that the institution of a formal exception to the prohibition on using journalists would cause great damage.

Chairman SPECTER. OK.

That's the final question. That is, would there be a significant difference as to how people around the world would treat journalists, subject them to danger, if the prohibition were absolute or if the prohibition had the limited exception of a Finding by the President?

Mr. Zuckerman.

Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I think there would be some difference. Again, these are things that are very difficult to quantify, but I think people abroad would not be able to see the situations in which there is a specific exception as a result of a Presidential Finding.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Koppel, do you think it would make a big difference if it were absolute, or the very limited exception for the President through a Finding?

Mr. KOPPEL. No, sir, I really don't. I think in that respect, Mr. Adelman is right. I think that's a distinction that's probably lost on most observers overseas.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Anderson.

Mr. ANDERSON. I have to agree to that, except I again would suggest that there have been indications in the past where Presidential Findings were not either clear or clearly observed.

Chairman SPECTER. We thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you very much for coming in.

Mr. KOPPEL. Thank you.

Chairman SPECTER. We appreciate your wisdom.

I'd like to call our next panel now. Dr. Don Argue, president of the National Association of Evangelicals; accompanied by Dr. John Orme, executive director of the International Foreign Mission Association; Sister Claudette LaVerdiere, president of the Maryknoll Sisters; Dr. Rodney Page, deputy general secretary of the World Church Services.

[Pause.]

Chairman SPECTER. We start with Dr. Don Argue, president of the National Association of Evangelicals, a group comprised of approximately 42,500 congregations nationwide from 49 member denominations and individual congregations. We welcome you here, Dr. Argue, and look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. DON ARGUE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EVANGELICALS

Dr. ARGUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The reason I have been asked to speak first, the National Association of Evangelicals was one of the first associations or organizations of size to speak out regarding the issue, and you have indicated already the constituency that we represent.

It is important for the committee to know that we have an unprecedented coalition who have signed the NAE statement of concern, and I would like to read that statement. It's brief. March, 1996, it was passed at our convention in Minneapolis. In the 1970's, the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America disclosed it had used clergy, journalists, and academics in

covert operations. In 1977, an intense campaign by religious groups and civil libertarians led to rules by the CIA which prohibited it from hiring or establishing any intelligence relationship, "with any U.S. clergy or missionary, whether or not ordained, who is sent out by a mission or church organization to preach, teach, heal, or proselytize."

Similar rules were later adopted barring employment of journalists and academics in covert operations overseas.

In 1996, the CIA Director declared that the ban on the use of journalists would be waived on in cases of, "unique and special threats to national security."

The CIA has thus far not clarified the possibility of a clergy loophole circumventing the 1977 rules. Because lifting the ban would jeopardize all missionaries, church, relief, community development, and refugee assistance workers ministering in politically sensitive areas as well as those with whom they work.

We, the undersigned, and I will read that list in a moment, urge our sending agencies to avoid any relationship with or supply any information to any intelligence agency or service. Such use of missionary agents for covert activities by the CIA would be unethical and immoral.

We insist that the CIA close any loophole that allows for intelligence gathering, collaboration with clergy, missionaries, and aid workers, and agree not to pose as religious workers. We insist that the CIA clarify and publish its policy for the protection of U.S. citizens serving in ministry abroad.

We request the Executive branch of the U.S. Government and the Select Committees on Intelligence of the Congress to cooperate in continuing to prohibit such inappropriate collaboration. We request that, if necessary, Executive Orders of the President be issued and legislation be passed by the Congress to correct this intolerable situation.

Signed and sponsored by the National Association of Evangelicals, joined in signing by the Evangelical Fellowship of Mission Agencies, Interdenominational Foreign Missions Association, Association of Christian Schools International, Youth of the Mission, Wythcliffe Bible Translators, U.S. Catholic Mission Association, Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers, Maryknoll Sisters, Office of Social Concern.

The signers of this statement of concern represent in excess, conservatively speaking, of over 50,000 Americans who are working as religious and relief persons around the world.

I would like to turn to my colleague, Dr. John Orme, to share further if he would, please.

Chairman SPECTER. Dr. Orme, welcome, and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN ORME, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN MISSION ASSOCIATION

Dr. ORME. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have a statement, after which I have anecdotal experiences, should the Chair so desire.

Chairman SPECTER. We will put your full statement in the Record, Dr. Orme, but you are on Dr. Argue's time. Except I think the clock just went back to start. But proceed.

Dr. ORME. Yes, I understand. Two minutes.

No one familiar with the world scene can doubt that the process of rapid social change has become the most notable feature of the latter half of the 20th century. The tremendous changes taking place have created upheaval in economic, political, and religious spheres. The interrelationship between ancient religions and political disputes, intertribal warfare and ethnic warfare, complicated by religio-political militance, makes life more complex for today's religious worker.

This is particularly problematic in Islamic countries where the world view does not separate politics and religions. Regrettably, terrorism and hostage-taking have become everyday concerns for foreign missionary personnel and their families. It is in this context that today's religious worker must attempt to minister effectively without becoming involved in the affairs of governments. In this context, trust and confidence are indispensable in any ministry relationship. Church leaders both in the United States and abroad have the right to expect that their religious workers speak only in the name of God and that mutual confidence not be tainted by intelligence gathering, be it by innocent cooperation, by being a conduit for funds and, much less, by manipulation.

Today, the clergy are under suspicion in many countries because of the wide publicity of CIA involvement with the clergy as reported in the mid-70's—and this is in the Congressional Record of December 15, 1975.

Since then, the film industry has dramatized the sensational side of intelligence gathering. Accurate or not, the public perception abroad of the Central Intelligence Agency is negative and prejudicial to the relationships of mutual confidence for foreign missionaries. Accurate or not, the CIA has become a symbol of intrigue, mistrust and of American intervention.

Now, this in no way indicts the Central Intelligence Agency or attempts to denigrate the legitimate role of intelligence-gathering within the Federal Government. However, the church has a separate sphere and role which must be kept separate from the influence of the affairs of State. The State, and in this case its intelligence gathering function, should not attempt to use the church for its own purposes.

The evangelical missions community, therefore, insists that the CIA publicly close any loophole which allows for intelligence gathering, collaboration with clergy, missionaries, and aid workers in order to protect the ministry, safety, and lives of its personnel and their families.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Orme.

We now turn to Sister Claudette LaVerdiere. We have proceeded in alphabetical order, Sister; that's what we consider to be the fairest.

Sister LaVerdiere has been a member of the MaryKnoll since—well, let me just say very experienced, and has a bachelor in education from Mary Rogers College and a master of theological studies from Catholic Theological Union.

I've learned from my wife, who is a Philadelphia councilwoman, who never listed any dates in any of her resumes, not to do so. I've

even adopted it for myself recently, so I will apply it to you, Sister LaVerdiere.

We appreciate your being here and look forward to your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF SISTER CLAUDETTE LAVERDIERE,
PRESIDENT, MARYKNOLL SISTERS CONGREGATION**

Sister LAVERDIERE. Thank you very much, Mr. Specter.

Thank you for your welcome and for this opportunity to testify. I am Sister Claudette LaVerdiere, president of the Maryknoll Sisters Congregation, a Catholic mission religious community of more than 750 women from 21 nations around the world.

We minister to and with poor people in 30 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Central Pacific, and the United States.

In my capacity as president of the congregation, I visit the sisters in their locales and have opportunity to see firsthand the work they do among the people and the difference they make in their lives. I myself have worked in Kenya for 22 years.

Our sisters work in education, health, community development, agriculture, social work, communications, and pastoral care. We seek, in all cases, to promote the fullness of life, inspired by the words of Jesus, "all came that they may have life and have it to the full."

The policy of the Central Intelligence Agency involving reporters, Peace Corps workers, and missionaries in intelligence gathering is of serious concern to us.

The policy that allows a waiver puts missionaries like ourselves and also the people with whom we work at great risk. Just as serious, it undermines the credibility of church personnel and destroys the trust which is so essential to our ministry with poor people and oppressed peoples everywhere. Without that basis of trust, our whole ministry is seriously undermined and jeopardized.

So, I join my colleagues in calling for the complete ban on loopholes that would be possible in this policy.

After we've all had a chance to speak, I will also welcome questions. Thank you.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Sister LaVerdiere.

We now turn to the Reverend Rodney I. Page, who is director of the Church World Service and Witness. Reverend Page is an ordained minister in the Christian Church, Disciples of Christ, and has a very distinguished academic record from Drake and Texas Christian University.

We welcome you, Dr. Page, and look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. RODNEY PAGE, DEPUTY GENERAL SECRETARY, CHURCH WORLD SERVICE AND WITNESS UNIT, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

Dr. PAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before the committee today.

I am also the deputy general secretary of the National Council of churches, which is an ecumenical organization of some 33 Protestant orthodox denominations in the United States, representing approximately 45 million people.

The Church World Service and Witness Unit is one of the two program units of the Council and within it, Church World Service operates a global relief development and refugee assistance ministry of the communions that work together through the National Council of Churches. It was founded in 1946 in partnership with local church organizations in more than 70 countries worldwide, and supporting sustainable self help development of people which respects the environment, we meet emergency needs and address root causes of poverty and powerlessness.

Within the United States, Church World Service resettles refugees, assists communities in responding to disasters. We have just recently been raising money for the church burnings throughout the country. We advocate for justice in U.S. policies which relate to global issues, and provide educational resources and offer opportunities for communities to join a people-to-people network of global and local caring through the participation in what is called crockwalks.

Because of our commitment to work all over the world in areas of great need, the staff and volunteers who work with Church World Service and other religious relief and missionary organizations are often in danger. In fact, I have just returned from Southeast Asia, and then Cambodia, I was in northern Cambodia in Batdambang, and the week after I left there a two star general and his 14 aids were murdered by Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. We operate along the Burma-Thai border refugee camps supplying food to those camps, and often times our drivers are murdered and aid workers are taken into hostage situations.

They go willingly to places where natural disaster, famine, and war cause desperate need and threaten personal security. Often they overtake these missions in partnership or at the request of the U.S. Government, in the belief that their own government will attempt to protect them if they are in danger. Consequently, it is particularly distressing to us to know that these dedicated workers may in fact be endangered by actions or suspected actions of that very government.

I refer specifically to the perception that religious workers may be recruited by U.S. intelligence organizations to serve as informants. We understand the Central Intelligence Agency has for many years operated under a general ban on the use of religious workers as informants. We also know that the CIA's rules allow for waiving this ban under special circumstances. It is the existence of this waiver authority that places religious workers in jeopardy. Whether or not the waiver authority is exercised by the CIA, the possibility that it could creates the perception that it is or will be.

The widely publicized recommendation made this spring by a task force on the Council on Foreign Relations that the ban on use of religious workers be reviewed only increases our concern about this issue.

At that time the heads of the member communions of the National Council of Churches wrote to CIA Director John Deutch that missionaries are often in the position to observe developments in society that need to be brought to the public's attention. We know, for example, that church workers are the first to report the epidemic of starvation in Liberia a few years ago. Such reporting,

done publicly, is a service to the whole community. However, to ask church workers to observe in a clandestine fashion and report secretly on what they see and hear is often to endanger their lives.

The mere public perception that a few U.S. missionaries and religious workers might be gathering information secretly for the Government undermines the trust of all workers that need to develop with the communities they serve in order to carry out their ministries. Because we believe so strongly that it is inappropriate for religious workers to gather this information for the Government, many of our communions have adopted policies requiring our personnel to refrain from contacts with the Government.

May I just close by saying that we still believe that this is the right approach to take to this action and this issue. A complete ban on the CIA and other intelligence gathering organizations to use religious workers. As long as there is any reason to suspect that religious workers may be agents of the U.S. Government, the lives and safety of these servants of the public good are in jeopardy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Page. We certainly do commend the activities of your organization worldwide, being subjected to the risks which you have just spoken about. Your Maryknoll Sisters as well, Sister LaVerdiere. And your extensive service, 22 years in Kenya.

Sister LAVERDIERE. Yes.

Chairman SPECTER. It is very impressive. I had an opportunity to visit Kenya 2 years ago.

Sister LaVerdiere, permit me to start with a question of you as to the imminence, the kind of danger that you feel your order runs into as you perform your services around the world. Do you think that—have you found that there is a concern or suspicion that the Maryknoll Sisters might be agents for the CIA?

Sister LAVERDIERE. Not directly, sir. That's why I spoke mostly to the effect of undermining the trust in our relationships with the people. My colleagues have mentioned that the seed of distrust is already planted. We make consistent efforts to counter it by our lives.

Chairman SPECTER. Where do the seeds of distrust originate, if you can help us with that question?

Sister LAVERDIERE. I think it came out in 1977, at the time when the policy was stated. At that time, the religious community mounted a concerted effort to make sure that this would not go unchallenged.

Chairman SPECTER. And what has your success been since 1977 with dispelling that concern?

Sister LAVERDIERE. Consistently, we try to be faithful to our own mandate of speaking in the name of God, as Mr. John Orme said; to be consistent in our own efforts and approach to the people, so as to dispel any suspicion. But that suspicion is still there, just because many of us are from the United States.

Chairman SPECTER. Dr. Page, in articulating the work of your group worldwide, Church World Service and Witness, have you seen specific cases where your representatives have come under suspicion of being agents for the CIA?

Dr. PAGE. I could point to recent experiences of my visit just to Southeast Asia recently, and in that that there is a suspicion that sometimes religious workers are indeed recruited and that some of our religious workers have been taken into captivity as hostages. That happened in Cambodia to a British relief worker. Some of the drivers of our trucks that have been taking rice into refugees—there's about 95,000 refugees living along the Thai-Burma border because of the continuing civil war in Burma—some of those drivers have been murdered. With the understanding by some people that they are indeed agents of the U.S. Government.

We have taken every precaution that we possibly can to dispel in any way, shape or form that we collaborate with the Government in the passing on of information. That is not to say, Mr. Chairman, that some people, religious workers, might volunteer on their own behalf to give information. But we in no way, shape, or form encourage our workers or allow our workers to be agents of the Government.

Chairman SPECTER. Dr. Argue and Dr. Orme, would it be sufficient in your view to have a rule where only the President might have a waiver, that under the strict Finding which requires it being in writing with the preceding deliberation, and then only in matters of national security? Would that be an acceptable exception in your view? Dr. Orme?

Dr. ORME. One of the problems we deal with, Mr. Chairman, is the atmosphere of suspicion and the politicization of the atmosphere virtually around the world. My experience is 14 years living in Guatemala, and so throughout Latin America there is a politicized effect. On the one level it is certainly understandable if there were an end of the world scenario, mass destruction, massive terrorism, where the President would certainly intervene on behalf of national interests. At the same time, we must do all we can at this point, and this is why we would require and ask for, rather, a public blanket statement that would clarify things to some degree for those in other countries. This will not be done even through one statement. It is going to take years to gain again the trust of those who—

Chairman SPECTER. But you would look for an absolute prohibition, even without a limited exception for the President on his determination?

Dr. ORME. I would prefer that. However, I understand in cases of national interest, there may be some end of the world type scenarios that we can't really prognosticate right now, we can't really predict what—

Chairman SPECTER. So would you accept that kind of an exception?

Dr. ORME. It would not be my first preference.

Chairman SPECTER. OK.

Well, my amber light is on, so I will now turn to our distinguished colleague, Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have just one question. I pose the question as one who has long been skeptical of any utilization of either news-gathering or clerical participation in intelligence operations, one who understands the need for a variety of different assets that the Intelligence Commu-

nity can draw upon, but who believes that there should be clear exceptions. But let me raise this one question and pose it to Dr. Page, if I may, although I would be interested in your comments. Is there a distinction to be drawn between clergy, Dr. Page, and the term you used: religious workers?

Dr. PAGE. Right.

Senator ROBB. At some point we have a problem of scope in who is included and who is excluded. If I may just suggest an analogous situation that might be sufficiently parallel: In the field of tax exemptions for charitable organizations, we permit those organizations to be tax exempt except for income that is derived in the same manner that a non-tax exempt organization might. The situation is not entirely parallel, but here you have a problem of definition, who would be included in the blanket immunity: whether it would be only someone who was ordained or somehow formally given the charge of a religious organization, or also apply to those who might be volunteers, might be friends, or might be paid employees who drive trucks, or other tasks of that nature.

Would you care to discuss where you think a line might be drawn, if you believe a line indeed would be appropriate?

Dr. PAGE. I am one that probably would not draw a line, Senator. I appreciate the question very much, because the minority of our workers around the world—as I say, we operate in some 70 different countries, not only in Southeast Asia, but Asia, Africa, Latin America, Central America, and so forth—the majority of our workers are not ordained. When we say religious workers we refer to all paid workers under the employ of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA. I would say that we would want a ban on all what we consider to be religious worker, those in our employment.

Senator ROBB. But let me just ask you, if you had someone whom you hired to perform services that did not directly affect the mission that you were performing, to do administrative or cooking or other activities, would you find a distinction there that would merit additional attention?

Dr. PAGE. I appreciate the question, and I would draw no line. I would want those people also exempted from being CIA informants or informants on behalf—gathering of intelligence on behalf of intelligence gathering agencies.

I think that this preserves the integrity of all of our workers who are in our employ, because whether they are a truck driver or a cook or a person that is working in other kinds of capacities other than directly in development work, they are people that we work with and deserve our protection and deserve the protection of our integrity.

Senator ROBB. I hear you. I am not sure I agree with that, even as one sympathetic to the need for some exclusion from permissible intelligence activity.

Dr. PAGE. I understand that, Senator. Maybe Sister, you would like to?

Senator ROBB. I was going to say, are there any others who might like to comment on that question of where you can see a legitimate distinction, if you accept the premise of my question that there has to be some way of limiting the kind of exclusion that

might otherwise preclude intelligence gathering activities from dealing with virtually anyone.

Sister LAVERDIERE. I assume you are speaking of American citizens?

Senator ROBB. You can address it either way. It could be interpreted, if it were broadly enough applied, to give anyone who was employed locally to assist your endeavors the same blanket immunity that has been requested for U.S. clergy and others.

Sister LAVERDIERE. I agree with Dr. Page that there be no lines drawn to distinguish between those who are associated with a mission and ourselves. Locally employed people are also associated with the religious purpose of that mission and are also trusted on the same basis as we are. Anyone associated with that mission, having a dual role of church worker and intelligence gatherer would become very mistrusted. Then, associated with us, we would also be mistrusted. I would not agree to a line of distinction between these workers and ourselves.

Senator ROBB. I understand your point of view.

Dr. ARGUE. I would quote from a letter that Senator Hatfield sent to Director Deutch where he makes the statement that I would say in response to your question. The suspicion created by CIA involvement with even one overseas member of U.S. based religious organization puts the welfare of all in jeopardy. Therefore, allowing a waiver of this policy is tantamount to declaring no policy at all.

Senator ROBB. Your positions are clear. You can understand the dilemma that we might face in terms of how broad an application of such a waiver or exemption might be. But I thank you for your testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Robb.

Thank you very much, Sister LaVerdiere, Dr. Argue, Dr. Orme, and Dr. Page. For those who expressed some concern about the public hearings on this matter, the testimony today, for any of those who might be watching around the world who might suspect journalists or church workers or Peace Corps workers to be operatives for the CIA might well be dissuaded from Director Deutch's testimony that it hasn't been done during his 14 months, and from the collateral information that it is a very, very rare occurrence, if ever, and for the very strong statements made about an American point of view against it, and certainly this is a matter which has been in the public domain with some emphasis since the report earlier this year by the Council on Foreign Relations on the Future of U.S. Intelligence, and the passage by the House of Representatives of legislation on the subject, 417 to 6, and a matter which is squarely before the Senate and a matter within the purview of the Intelligence Committee to take a look at what the CIA is doing and make an evaluation of it and consider whether there ought to be legislation on the subject. So that this is not a matter that we have made any unique disclosures on today. To the extent that others may be looking, if they thought every church goer or journalist or Peace Corps operative was a CIA secret agent, they would get a very, very different view from what we have heard here today.

But we commend you on what you are doing worldwide, the Maryknoll missionaries, and with the religious organizations; and we will do our best to protect your interests and your activities.

You made a reference to the letter from Senator Hatfield, and his letter of February 28, 1996, strongly opposing the use of church goers will be made a part of the record.

[The letter referred to follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, February 28, 1996.

Hon. JOHN DEUTCH,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. DIRECTOR: It is with great disappointment and concern that I note recent reports regarding the possible relaxation of the Central Intelligence Agency's regulation prohibiting the use of American clergy or missionaries abroad. It is my firm belief that this practice tarnishes the image of the United States, prostitutes the church, and violates the first amendment's separation of church and state. Your pronouncement that the regulation is subject to waiver, as well as a recent panel's recommendation to loosen the restrictions, are very disturbing to hear.

As you know, the internal regulation prohibiting the use of clergy and missionaries abroad was issued in 1976, following a personal exchange between myself and then-Director George Bush. In return for Director Bush's assurances, I withdrew legislation which would have created a statutory prohibition against Federal intelligence agency involvement with members of the clergy and missionaries. I do not recall it being conveyed to me at that time that the new regulation could later be waived at the discretion of a particular director or deputy director.

When we allow the CIA or any other government intelligence agency to use our missionaries to perform political intelligence operations, we prevent the church's mission and bring discredit upon the foreign policies and credibility of the United States. Moreover, the suspicion created by CIA involvement with even one overseas member of U.S.-based religious organizations puts the welfare of all missionaries in jeopardy. Therefore, allowing a waiver of this policy is tantamount to declaring no policy at all.

While I appreciate your attempt to clarify that these activities would be initiated and approved only in extraordinary situations, I again have to reiterate my strong opposition to this practice under any circumstances. It is my hope that you will reaffirm the CIA's regulation prohibiting these activities and clarify that waivers will not be given in the case of members of the clergy or missionaries.

Thank you for your personal attention to this matter.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely,

MARK O. HATFIELD,
U.S. Senator.

Chairman SPECTER. So we thank you, and that concludes the hearing.

Sister LAVERDIERE. Thank you.

Dr. ORME. Thank you.

Dr. PAGE. Thank you.

Dr. ARGUE. Thank you.

[Thereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK D. GEARAN

Mr. Chairman, the issue that this committee is considering today—the Central Intelligence Agency's policy regarding the possible use of clergy, journalists, and the Peace Corps—is of profound concern to me as the Director of the Peace Corps, to the almost 7,000 Americans who are currently serving as Volunteers in 93 countries, and to the more than 145,000 Americans who have joined the Peace Corps over the last 35 years. This issue goes directly to what I consider to be my most important responsibility as Director of the Peace Corps—ensuring the safety and security of Volunteers and protecting the integrity of the Peace Corps' mission in the developing world. Therefore, let me be clear about my views on this matter: The current and longstanding policy of keeping the Peace Corps completely separate from any intelligence agency or activities is essential and must be kept firmly in place. Any change, or the mere suggestion of change, is both misguided and dangerous.

It has been the policy of the U.S. Government since the Peace Corps was established in 1961 to maintain a wall of separation between the Peace Corps and all intelligence agencies. There are powerful reasons for rigid adherence to this fundamental principle. Most importantly, if Peace Corps Volunteers were thought to be part of any intelligence activities, their safety and security would be placed at grave risk in very country where they serve. Moreover, the mere suspicion that Volunteers might be involved in intelligence activities would compromise their ability to earn the trust and respect of the people they serve in developing countries, and would preclude them from performing their jobs. In other words, maintaining this policy is crucial to the Peace Corps.

To insulate the Peace Corps and our Volunteers from any intelligence agency or activity, it has been the Peace Corps' longstanding policy to exclude from Peace Corps Volunteer service and employment any persons who have engaged in intelligence activity or related work, or who have been employed by or connected with an intelligence agency. The Peace Corps Manual states in clear terms that "persons currently or formerly employed by the Central Intelligence Agency shall be permanently ineligible for Peace Corps Volunteer service or employment by the Peace Corps." In addition, any individual who has personally been involved in intelligence activities or who has worked for any other U.S. Government agency, the mission of which substantially includes intelligence activities, is not eligible for Peace Corps service or employment for a minimum of 10 years.

The policy of keeping the Peace Corps completely separate from any intelligence agency or activity has been supported at the highest levels of every Administration, both Democratic and Republican, since the Kennedy Administration. In a cable to all diplomatic and consular posts in June 1983, then Secretary of State George Schultz issued the following instructions: "As in the past, separation between the Peace Corps and intelligence activities must be complete and absolute. There should not be any contact whatsoever between anyone in the Intelligence Community and any Peace Corps Volunteer or trainee." This policy was reaffirmed in a July 1991 cable to our overseas posts from then-Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and, most recently, in a December 1995 cable from Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Since the Peace Corps' inception, there also has been a clear understanding with the Director of Central Intelligence about the critical need to maintain a complete separation between the Peace Corps and any intelligence activities. This understanding was formalized in a January 1978 letter from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of Action (the Peace Corps' former parent organization). A formal written agreement signed between the two agencies in November 1989 further ensures our complete separation in every respect.

When this issue became the subject of some discussion a few months ago, Robert Gates, who was the Director of Central Intelligence under President Bush, stated the following in a letter to me: "I have long believed that under no circumstances should American clergy, Peace Corps or AID officers be used by CIA, nor should the Agency ever use any of the three for cover. [F]or their protection and to minimize their risk, U.S. public and private policy should be that CIA will not make use of these organizations, their staffs, or their names." (emphasis in original)

Today, CIA Director John Deutch affirmed again before this committee that it continues to be the CIA's policy "not to use Peace Corps personnel for intelligence purposes." I appreciate his strong and public commitment to this very sound and wise policy.

Mr. Chairman, I know of and appreciate your strong support for the Peace Corps and the work of our Volunteers. They are altruistic Americans who, in the spirit of trust and friendship, want to serve our country and the people of developing countries by helping to address some of the world's most pressing problems, such as poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and lack of economic opportunity. Moreover, Peace Corps Volunteers have strengthened America's ties with, and understanding of, people in developing countries in a very personal way. Their hard work and spirit of service have earned enormous goodwill and respect for our country. This is the genius of the Peace Corps, and we should do everything we can to protect it.

For 35 years, the Peace Corps has worked diligently and with great success to reassure the host country governments and communities that Volunteers have absolutely no connection to U.S. intelligence agencies. It is my responsibility, as Director of the Peace Corps, to ensure that this hard-earned trust is respected and preserved.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Government has many other means and resources to deal with threats to our national security. The Peace Corps, however, does not have a role in these matters, nor should it. I believe this bipartisan policy, which has broad

support both within and outside of our government, has worked remarkably well for more than three decades, and it is central to the Peace Corps' future.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this important issue.

BIOGRAPHY OF DON ARGUE, ED.D.

Don Argue, Ed.D., became president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) on April 1, 1995. In a historic election, he was chosen by a unanimous vote on Tuesday, December 13, 1994.

The NAE is comprised of approximately 42,500 congregations nationwide from 49 member denominations and individual congregations from an additional 26 denominations, as well as several hundred independent churches. The membership of the association includes 289 parachurch ministries and educational institutions. Through the cooperative ministry of these members, the National Association of Evangelicals directly and indirectly benefits over 27 million people.

Argue had served as president of North Central College, Minneapolis, MN, since 1979. Under his leadership, the college grew from an enrollment of 401 to over 1,500 (1,182 on campus and 400+ non-traditional) and received the *Cristianity Today* Decade of Growth Award in recognition of its being the fastest growing college of its kind in the Nation during the 1980s.

A graduate of Central Bible College, Argue earned a master's degree at Santa Clara University, CA; and a doctorate at the University of the Pacific, California. He has also done postgraduate study at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA; Regent College, Vancouver, BC, Canada.

In prior years he served as dean of students and campus pastor at Evangel College in Springfield, MO. He was pastor of churches in San Jose and Morgan Hill, CA.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Sister Claudette LaVerdiere, M.M., Community President, Maryknoll Sisters

Educational Background

College: Mary Rogers College, Maryknoll, New York

Degree: Bachelor of Science in Education

Date: June, 1967

Graduate School: Catholic Theological Union, Chicago, Illinois

Degree: Masters of Theological Studies

Date: May, 1986

Ministry Experience

1956: Entered Maryknoll Sisters Congregation from the Diocese of Portland, Maine.

1968-1971: Classroom Teacher, Nganza Secondary School for Girls, Mwanza, Tanzania.

Subjects: Religion, English and Geography

1974-1976: Teacher of Religious Education, Secondary Schools, Nakuru, Kenya.

1976-1979: Catechetical Director, Diocese of Nakuru, Kenya, Africa.

1980-1984: Member, Development Education Team, Diocese of Mombasa, Kenya, Africa.

Work: Organizing and giving workshops in development, leadership, social analysis, communications and evaluation.

Focus: Women's Development

1987-1990: Professor of Theology and Scripture, Institutes of Religious Formation in Kenya:

—St. Thomas Aquinas Major Seminary

—Apostles of Jesus Seminary

—African School of Theology—Hekima College

—Theological Centre of Religious—Major Seminary

Oct. 1990: Elected as President of the Maryknoll Sisters Congregation as the first President whose mission experience has been primarily in Africa.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A.

CHURCH WORLD SERVICE & WITNESS

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON THE REVEREND RODNEY I. PAGE

Director, Church World Service and Witness.

Executive Director, Church World Service, Inc.

Deputy General Secretary, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

The Reverend Rodney I. Page is an ordained minister in the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

Mr. Page earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from Drake University, in Des Moines, IA, and a Bachelor of Divinity degree from Texas Christian University, in Fort Worth, TX. He has also been granted an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree from Northwest Christian College, Eugene, OR.

Mr. Page began his career as a campus minister at Portland State University and then became Associate Director of the Greater Portland Council of Churches. He became Associate Director of the Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon in 1973, moving to the Executive Director's position where he served for 13 years.

Mr. Page has been active in civil and religious organizations such as the City Club of Portland, the Oregon Council on Crime and Delinquency, the Regional Drug Initiative, the Oregon Interreligious Committee for Peace in the Middle East, Kiwanis and the Disciples Peace Fellowship.

He has served as Chair of the State of Oregon Civil Rights Commission, the City of Portland Fair Housing Task Force and the City of Portland Police Use of Force Committee. He received the Oregon Citizen of the Year award in 1982, the Oregon Peace Prize in 1991, the Equal Opportunity Award from the Urban League in 1992, the Indochinese Cultural Award for work on behalf of Refugee Resettlement and the American Civil Liberties Union E.B. McNaughton Award in 1995.

Mr. Page has moderated numerous television and radio programs. His tenure with NCCC began, April 1, 1996.

CAPITAL CITIES/ABC, INC. TELEVISION NETWORK GROUP

BIOGRAPHY

TED KOPPEL, ANCHOR, ABC NEWS "NIGHTLINE"

Ted Koppel, a 33-year veteran of ABC News, was named anchor of "Nightline" when the broadcast was introduced in March, 1980. In his anchor role, Mr. Koppel is the principal on-air reporter and interviewer for television's first late-night network news program. In addition, Mr. Koppel is the program's Managing Editor.

Each weekday evening, from 11:35 p.m. to 12:05 a.m. (ET), "Nightline" provides in-depth reporting on one or more of the major stories in the news through a combination of live interviews with newsmakers and background reports from "Nightline" reporters in the field.

In its 17th year on the air, "Nightline" is still considered one of the finest innovations in broadcast news. Said a commentary in *The Philadelphia Inquirer* in 1993, ". . . 'Nightline,' frequently a beacon of responsibility in a frequently irresponsible medium, proves that television can be an invaluable part of the American system." And from *Vanity Fair*, "For more than a decade, 'Nightline' has shaped the news and even history . . ."

"Nightline's" success is due in large part to the exemplary Ted Koppel, who has established a reputation among viewers, critics, and his peers as a journalist par excellence. "Koppel's implicit moral authority helps explain why 'Nightline' has become such a key test for public figures . . . and others to defend themselves when fighting for their careers," wrote *Vanity Fair*. *The New York Times* said, "Mr. Koppel is like an unflappable commander whose very presence and unhurried cadences bring the troops to order, just the way he controls the personages who are honored by invitations to 'Nightline.'" Mr. Koppel has been cited by *The Wall Street Journal* as "the pre-eminent TV interviewer in America," while *The Los Angeles Times* refers to him as "the undisputed reigning lion of tough TV interview journalism."

Mr. Koppel has won every major broadcasting award, including 25 Emmy Awards, five George Foster Peabody Awards, eight duPont-Columbia Awards, nine Overseas Press Club Awards, two George Polk Awards, and two Sigma Delta Chi Awards, the highest honor bestowed for public service by the Society of Professional Journalists.



Mr. Koppel was honored with the first Goldsmith Lifetime Achievement Award for Excellence in Journalism by the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University. In addition, he was the recipient of the prestigious Gabriel Personal Achievement Award from the National Catholic Association of Broadcasters and Communicators. In 1985, Mr. Koppel was honored with the first Gold Baton in the history of the duPont-Columbia Awards for "Nightline's" week-long series originating from South Africa. Mr. Koppel and "Nightline" were cited for "the most extraordinarily television of the year."

Mr. Koppel was named the first recipient of the Sol Taishoff Award presented by Broadcasting Magazine. He was voted best interviewer on radio or TV by *The Washington Journalism Review* in 1987, and was named Broadcaster of the Year by the International Television and Radio Society. Mr. Koppel was is an inductee of the Broadcasting Hall of Fame.

In 1994, Mr. Koppel was named a Chevalier de L'ordre des Arts et des Lettres from the Republic of France. He has received honorary degrees from Syracuse University, Colgate University, The University of South Carolina, American University, New England School of Law, Fairfield University, Middlebury College, Georgetown School of Law, Dartmouth College, Knox College, Howard University, Duke University, Saint Louis University, University of Pennsylvania, Tufts University, Johns Hopkins University and Catholic University.

Before his "Nightline" assignment, Mr. Koppel worked as an anchor, foreign and domestic correspondent and bureau chief for ABC News.

From 1971 to 1980, he was ABC News' Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, and for a 2-year period beginning in 1975, he anchored "The ABC Saturday Night News."

His diplomatic assignment included coverage of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a tour of duty that took Mr. Koppel more than a quarter of a million miles during the days of Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy."

During the time he was on the State Department beat, Mr. Koppel co-wrote the best seller, "In the National Interest," with his friend and colleague, Marvin Kalb, formerly of CBS News.

Before being named Diplomatic Correspondent, Mr. Koppel was ABC News Hong Kong Bureau Chief from 1969 to 1971. In this position, he traveled hundreds of thousands of miles to cover stories from Vietnam to Australia.

In 1968, he became Miami Bureau Chief for ABC News, where his assignments included covering Latin America.

On the political beat, he has had a major reporting role in every presidential nominating convention—a total of 16—since 1964. He co-anchored ABC News' coverage of the 1980 Democratic and Republican National Conventions and ABC election night coverage.

Mr. Koppel joined ABC News, New York in 1963, as a full-time general assignment correspondent at the age of 23. Prior to joining ABC News he worked at WMCA Radio in New York City, where he was a desk assistant and an occasional off-air reporter.

A native of Lancashire, England, Mr. Koppel moved to the United States with his parents when he was 13 years old. He holds a Bachelor of Science from Syracuse University and an M.A. in mass communications research and political science from Stanford.

He is married to the former Grace Anne Domey of New York City. They reside in Potomac, MD, and have four children.

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